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Liberalism	  rests	  on	  a	  bedrock	  of	  illiberalism.	  	  That	  is	  to	  say	  one	  cannot	  be	  a	  
liberal	  ‘all	  the	  way	  down.’	  	  If	  that	  is	  so,	  then	  it	  raises	  the	  question,	  At	  what	  
level	  does	  liberalism	  demand	  that	  one	  be	  ‘liberal,’	  and	  why?	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   Lawrence	  Alexander1	  	   	  In	  January,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  announced	  its	  decision	  in	  Hosanna	  Tabor	  v.	  EEOC	  and	  gave	   its	   official	   blessing	   to	   the	   controversial	   bit	   of	   doctrine	   known	   as	   the	   “ministerial	  exception.”2	  	   The	   exception,	   which	   has	   been	   alive	   in	   the	   Circuit	   Courts	   for	   nearly	   forty	  years, 3 	  exempts	   religious	   organizations	   from	   employment	   discrimination	   laws	   in	   the	  context	  of	  “ministerial”	  hiring	  decisions.4	  	  Thus,	  such	  organizations	  are	  free	  to	  discriminate	  against	  ministerial	   employees	   not	   only	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   religion—which	   various	   statutory	  exemptions	  already	  permit5—but	  also	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  race,	  gender,	  sexual	  orientation,	  and	  disability.6	  	  Several	  thoughtful	  and	  well-­‐respected	  voices	  have	  suggested	  that	  this	  effectively	  places	  churches	  “above	  the	  law,”	  and	  in	  some	  sense	  these	  criticisms	  seem	  to	  ring	  true.7	  	  The	  constitutional	   justification	  often	  offered	   for	   this	   state	  of	   affairs,	   however,	   is	   that	   churches	  are	  not	  so	  much	  above	  the	  civil	  law,	  as	  simply	  outside	  of	  its	  jurisdiction.8	  	  That	  is,	  while	  we	  may	   disapprove	   of	   the	   ways	   that	   a	   church	   selects	   its	   leadership—indeed,	   we	   may	   even	  believe	   that	   certain	   hiring	   practices	   are	   illegal—our	   constitutional	   structure	   simply	   does	  not	  empower	  the	  government	  to	  intervene	  in	  matters	  of	  church	  governance.	  	  And	  we	  have	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  *	  Associate	  Professor	  of	  Law,	  William	  S.	  Boyd	  School	  of	  Law,	  UNLV.	  	  Many	  thanks	  to	  Marc	  DeGirolami,	  Leslie	  Griffin,	  Rick	  Garnett,	  and	  Paul	  Horwitz	  for	  helpful	  insight	  and	  commentary.	  1	  Larry	  Alexander,	   Illiberalism	  All	  the	  Way	  Down:	  Illiberal	  Groups	  and	  Two	  Conceptions	  of	  Liberalism,	  12	  J.	  OF	  CONTEMP.	  LEG.	  ISSUES	  625,	  625	  (2002).	  2	  Hosanna-­‐Tabor	  v.	  EEOC,	  132	  S.Ct.	  694	  (2012).	  3	  The	  seminal	  case	  is	  McClure	  v.	  Salvation	  Army,	  460	  F.2d	  553	  (5th	  Cir.	  1972).	  4	  Id.	  5	  E.g.,	  Civil	  Rights	  Act	  of	  1964,	  42	  U.S.C.	  §	  2000e-­‐1(a)	  (2006).	  6	  Hosanna-­‐Tabor,	  132	  S.Ct.	  at	  710.	  7	  See	  Leslie	   C.	   Griffin,	   The	   Sins	   of	  Hosanna-­‐Tabor,	  88	   IND.	   L.	   J.	   ___	   (forthcoming	   2013)	   available	   at:	  http://ssrn.com/abstract=2026046;	   Caroline	   Mala	   Corbin,	   Above	   the	   Law?	   The	   Constitutionality	   of	  
the	  Ministerial	  Exception	  from	  Antidiscrimination	  Law,	  75	  FORDHAM	  L.	  REV.	  1965	  (2007).	  8	  E.g.,	  Thomas	  C.	  Berg,	  Kimberlee	  Wood	  Colby,	  Carl	  H.	  Esbeck,	  Richard	  W.	  Garnett,	  RELIGIOUS	  FREEDOM,	  CHURCH-­‐STATE	  SEPARATION,	   AND	  THE	  MINISTERIAL	  EXCEPTION,	   106	   NW.	  U.	  L.	  REV.	  COLL.	   174,	   185	   (2011);	  Gregory	  Kalscheur,	  Civil	  Procedure	  and	  the	  Establishment	  Clause:	  	  Exploring	  the	  Ministerial	  Exception,	  
Subject	  Matter	   Jurisdiction,	   and	   the	   Freedom	  of	   the	   Church,	   17	  WM.	  &	  MARY	  BILL	  OF	  RTS.	   J.	  43,	  63-­‐69	  (2008).	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structured	   our	   Constitution	   in	   this	   way	   based,	   in	   large	   part,	   on	   the	   liberal	   Lockean	  conviction	  that	  church	  and	  state	  operate	  within	  separate	  and	  incommensurable	  spheres.9	  	  	  	  Carried	  to	   its	   logical	  extreme,	  however,	   this	  conception	  of	  separate	  and	  independent	  religious	   sovereignty	   suggests	   that	   the	   bar	   to	   governmental	   intervention	   in	   church	  governance	   is	   absolute;	   that	   a	   church	   can	   do	   anything—including,	   presumably,	   perform	  sacrificial	   rituals—that	   its	   members	   believe	   essential	   to	   basic	   governance	   decisions.	   	   In	  truth,	  however,	  no	  one	  I	  know	  of	  holds	  this	  sort	  of	  extreme,	  absolutist	  view,	  and	  thus	  arises	  the	  theoretical	  puzzle	  this	  essay	  addresses.	   	   If	  religious	  sovereignty	   is	  not	  absolute—if	  the	  liberal	   check	   on	   the	   state’s	   power	   to	   invade	   church	   jurisdiction	   does	   not	   go	   “all	   the	  way	  down”—then	  where	  do	  the	  limits	  on	  that	  sovereignty	  lie,	  and	  how	  do	  we	  determine	  that	  a	  church	  has	   exceeded	   them?10	  	   In	  what	   follows,	   I	   draw	   some	   lessons	   from	  Thomas	  Kuhn’s	  thoughts	   about	   the	   shared	   grounds	   on	   which	   scientists	   justify	   their	   choices	   between	  incommensurable	   theoretical	  paradigms.	   	  Ultimately,	   I	   conclude	   that	  we	  can	  and	  do	  make	  decisions	   about	   the	   scope	   of	   religious	   sovereignty	   by	   balancing	   constitutional	   purposes	  against	   one	   another	   in	  making	  what	   Kuhn	   called	   “value	   judgments.”11	  	   In	   the	   case	   of	   the	  ministerial	  exception,	  it	  is	  my	  constitutional	  value	  judgment	  that	  racial	  discrimination	  both	  exceeds	   the	   limits	  of	   independent	   religious	   sovereignty,	   and	   justifies	   state	   intervention	   in	  church	  governance.12	   	  SEPARATE	  AND	  INCOMMENSURABLE	  SPHERES	  	  I	   have	   suggested	   that	   our	   constitutional	   structure	   conceives	   of	   church	   and	   state	   as	  occupying	   separate	   and,	   I	  will	   argue,	   incommensurable	   spheres.	   	   This	   conception	   derives	  principally	   from	   the	   thoughts	   of	   John	   Locke,	  who	   gave	   the	  most	   powerful	   and	   influential	  such	   account	   in	   A	   Letter	   Concerning	   Toleration.13 	  	   For	   Locke,	   these	   separate	   spheres	  consisted	  first	  of	  the	  “outward	  things”	  committed	  to	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  civil	  magistrate,	  and,	   second,	   of	   the	   “inward	   persuasion	   of	   the	   mind”	   that	   may	   lead	   to	   the	   “salvation	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  See	  JOHN	  LOCKE,	  A	  LETTER	  CONCERNING	  TOLERATION	  26-­‐30	  (Hackett	  Publishing,	  1983)	  (1689).	  10	  I	  am	  by	  no	  means	  the	  first	  to	  ask	  these	  questions,	  e.g.,	  Stanley	  Fish,	  Mission	  Impossible:	  Settling	  the	  
Just	   Bounds	   Between	   Church	   and	   State,	   97	   COLUM.	   L	   REV.	   2255	   (1997),	   though	   I	   believe	   that	   my	  answers	  are	  largely	  novel.	  	  11	  Thomas	  S.	  Kuhn,	  Objectivity,	  Value	  Judgment,	  and	  Theory	  Choice,	   in	  THOMAS	  S.	  KUHN,	  THE	  ESSENTIAL	  TENSION:	   SELECTED	   STUDIES	   IN	   SCIENTIFIC	   TRADITION	   AND	   CHANGE	   320	   (1977);	   see	   also	   Ian	   Bartrum,	  
Constitutional	  Value	   Judgments	  and	  Interpretive	  Theory	  Choice,	   40	   FLA.	  ST.	  U.	  L.	  REV	  ___	   (forthcoming	  2012).	  12	  I	  have	  made	  this	  argument	  elsewhere	  in	  greater	  detail	  than	  I	  will	  here.	   	  See	  Ian	  Bartrum,	  Religion	  
and	  Race:	  The	  Ministerial	  Exception	  Reexamined,	  106	  NW.	  U.	  L.	  REV.	  COLL.	  191	  (2011).	  13	  LOCKE,	  supra	  note	  9,	  at	  25-­‐30	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souls.”14	  	  That	  the	  state	  could	  exercise	  no	  jurisdiction	  over	  the	  latter—the	  “care	  of	  souls”—was	  easy	  enough	  to	  demonstrate	  with	  three	  negative	  proofs:	  	  (1)	  God	  has	  never	  “given	  such	  authority	  to	  one	  man	  over	  another”;	  (2)	  The	  state	  possesses	  only	  “outward	  force”	  and	  thus	  cannot	   change	   men’s	   inward	   opinions;	   and	   (3)	   Even	   if	   the	   application	   of	   outward	   force	  
could	   change	  men’s	  minds	   it	  would	  not	   “help	   at	   all	   to	   the	   salvation	  of	   their	   souls,”	  which	  depends	   upon	   the	   free	   exercise	   of	   “their	   own	   reason.”15	  	   In	   short,	   Locke	   argued	   that	   the	  state	   cannot	   exercise	   jurisdiction	   over	   the	   inward	   sphere	   because	   it	   is	   incompetent—it	  simply	  lacks	  the	  capability	  to	  do	  so.	  	  	  Within	  the	  context	  of	  religious	  belief	  or	  doctrine,	  then,	  the	  state	  does	  not	  grant	  churches	  some	  set	  of	  rights	  or	  freedoms;	  it	  never	  had	  the	  ability	  to	  limit	  those	  freedoms	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  In	   the	   context	   of	   religiously	   motivated	   actions,	   however—particularly	   those	  undertaken	   in	   the	  exercise	  of	  church	  governance—the	  distinction	  between	  “outward”	  and	  “inward”	   is	   not	   so	   easily	   drawn.	   	   Only	   church	   members	   are	   capable	   of	   forming	   inward	  judgments	   on	   church	   leadership	   matters,	   but	   if	   a	   church	   must	   leave	   the	   exercise	   of	  compulsive	   force	   over	   “outward”	   actions	   to	   the	   state,	   how	   can	   it	   carry	   out	   or	   enforce	   its	  “inward”	   judgments?	   	   Locke	   addressed	   this	  question	  head	  on,	   and	   concluded	   that	   control	  over	   church	   membership	   (and	   presumably	   leadership)	   must	   generally	   remain	   with	   the	  institutions	  themselves.	  	  In	  assessing	  the	  extent	  of	  a	  church’s	  duty	  to	  tolerate	  countervailing	  beliefs,	   he	   drew	   a	   bright	   line:	   	   “[F]irst,	   I	   hold,	   that	   no	   church	   is	   bound	   by	   the	   duty	   of	  toleration	  to	  retain	  [a	  nonadherent]	  in	  her	  bosom	  ….	  For	  [if	  breach	  of	  religious	  bonds]	  were	  permitted	   without	   any	   animadversion,	   the	   society	   would	   immediately	   be	   thereby	  dissolved.”16	  	  Thus,	  while	  a	  church	  lacks	  authority	  to	  impose	  physical	  or	  financial	  penalties,	  it	   must	   retain	   exclusive	   control	   over	   the	   power	   of	   excommunication.17	  	   In	   other	   words,	  though	   excommunication	   is	   technically	   an	   “outward”	   action,	   it	   is	   a	   power	   is	   so	   bound	  up	  with	   a	   church’s	   very	   existence	   that	   Locke	   chose	   to	   treat	   it	   as	   belonging	   to	   the	   “inward”	  sphere	   that	   lies	   beyond	   state	   competence.	   	   And	   for	   the	  modern	   defender	   of	   independent	  religious	   sovereignty	   in	   general,	   and	   the	   ministerial	   exception	   in	   particular,	   Locke’s	  argument	  here	  remains	  the	  fountainhead	  of	  a	  powerful	  bar	  on	  state	  jurisdiction	  over	  church	  governance	  decisions.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Id.	  at	  26-­‐27.	  15	  Id.	  at	  26-­‐28.	  16	  Id.	  at	  30.	  	  For	  an	  excellent	  statement	  of	  this	  position,	  see	  Chris	  Lund’s	  discussion	  of	  the	  ministerial	  exception’s	   “relational”	  component.	   	  Christopher	  C.	  Lund,	   In	  Defense	  of	  the	  Ministerial	  Exception,	  90	  N.C.	  L.	  REV	  101,	  121-­‐22	  (2011).	  17	  LOCKE,	  supra	  note	  9,	  at	  30-­‐31.	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Even	  given	  his	  separationist	  rhetoric,	  however,	   it	   is	  clear	   that	  Locke	  did	  not	  hold	  an	  absolutist	   view	   of	   organizational	   religious	   sovereignty.	   	   Indeed,	   later	   in	   the	   Letter	   he	  identified	   explicit	   limits	   on	   the	   state’s	   duty	   to	   tolerate	   problematic	   religious	   doctrine.18	  	  First,	  he	  argued,	  “no	  opinions	  contrary	  to	  human	  society,	  or	  to	  those	  moral	  rules	  necessary	  to	   the	   preservation	   of	   civil	   society,	   are	   to	   be	   tolerated	   by	   the	  magistrate.”19	  	   Further,	   the	  state	  should	  not	  defer	  to	  any	  church	  that	  attributes	  to	  its	  membership	  a	  “peculiar	  privilege	  or	  power	  above	  other	  mortals,”20	  nor	  to	  any	  church	  that	  requires	   its	  adherents	   to	  “deliver	  themselves	  up	  to	  the	  protection	  and	  service	  of	  another	  prince.”21	  	  Finally,	  the	  state	  need	  not	  abide	  atheists,	  who	  “can	  have	  no	  pretence	  of	  religion	  whereupon	  to	  challenge	  the	  privilege	  of	  toleration.”22	  	  The	  very	  possibility	  of	  such	  exceptions	  demonstrates	  that,	  even	  for	  Locke,	  the	  liberal	  independence	  of	  religious	  sovereignty	  does	  not	  go	  “all	  the	  way	  down”;	  at	  bottom	  even	  his	  framework	  rests	  on	  a	  bit	  of	  Hobbesian	  bedrock.	   	  And,	  perhaps	  more	  importantly,	  the	   exceptions	   make	   clear	   that	   the	   state’s	   jurisdictional	   incompetence	   over	   individual	  religious	  belief	  does	  not	  apply	  to	  all	  church	  governance	  decisions.	  	  Some	  of	  those	  decisions	  we	  may	  consider	  “outward”	  acts,	  and,	  although	  the	  state	  may	  be	  powerless	  to	  “change	  men’s	  minds,”	   it	  certainly	  has	  the	  means	  to	  prevent	   the	  worldly	  enactment	  of	  church	  policy.23	  	   It	  would	   seem,	   then,	   that	   Locke’s	   argument	   about	   state	   noninterference	   in	   at	   least	   some	  church	  governance	  jurisdictions	  is	  firmly	  based	  in	  tolerance,	  not	  incompetence.	  	  	  On	   this	   side	   of	   the	  Atlantic,	   there	   is	   little	   doubt	   that	   Locke’s	   conception	   of	   separate	  spheres	  and	  sovereignty	  was	  central	  to	  the	  early	  American	  conception	  of	  religious	  freedom,	  particularly	   as	   defended	   by	   James	   Madison	   and	   Thomas	   Jefferson	   in	   colonial	   Virginia.24	  	  Along	   with	   Locke’s	   separatism,	   however,	   the	   Constitution’s	   framers	   and	   ratifiers	   also	  accepted	  the	  necessity	  of	  an	  underlying	  illiberalism.	  	  Indeed,	  several	  state	  constitutions—to	  which	   it	   seems	   the	   federal	   plan	   entrusted	   substantive	   questions	   about	   religious	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Id.	  at	  49-­‐51.	  19	  Id.	  at	  49.	  	  Locke	  quickly	  qualified,	  however,	  “of	  those	  indeed	  examples	  in	  any	  church	  are	  rare.”	  	  Id.	  20	  Id.	  at	  50.	  21	  Id.	  	  This	  seems	  a	  thinly	  veiled	  shot	  at	  the	  Catholics	  that	  had	  precipitated	  his	  exile	  in	  Holland,	  from	  where	  he	  wrote	  A	  Letter	  Concerning	  Toleration.	  	  22	  Id.	  at	  51.	  23	  Id.	  at	  27.	  24	  See,	   e.g.,	  THOMAS	   JEFFERSON,	  VIRGINIA	  STATUTE	  OF	  RELIGIOUS	  FREEDOM,	   reprinted	   in	   THOMAS	   JEFFERSON:	  WORD	   FOR	   WORD	   55-­‐57	   (Maureen	   Harrison	   &	   Steve	   Gilbert	   eds.,	   1993)	   (1779);	   JAMES	   MADISON,	  MEMORIAL	   AND	  REMONSTRANCE	  AGAINST	  RELIGIOUS	  ASSESSMENTS,	   reprinted	   in	  THE	  MIND	   OF	   THE	   FOUNDER:	  SOURCES	   OF	   THE	   POLITICAL	   THOUGHT	   OF	   JAMES	  MADISON	   6-­‐7	   (Marvin	   Meyer,	   ed.,	   1981)	   (1785);	   accord	  Noah	   Feldman,	   The	   Intellectual	   Origins	   of	   the	   Establishment	   Clause,	   77	   N.Y.U.	   L.	   REV.	   346,	   381-­‐83	  (2002).	  
	   5	  
establishment25—explicitly	   qualified	   the	   principle	   of	   religious	   freedom.	   Massachusetts	  recognized	   an	   individual’s	   right	   to	   worship	   according	   “to	   the	   dictates	   of	   his	   conscience,”	  with	  the	  express	  caveat	  that	  “he	  doth	  not	  disturb	  the	  peace.”26	  	  New	  Hampshire,	  New	  Jersey,	  Maryland,	  Rhode	  Island,	  and	  Georgia	  all	  made	  similar	  exceptions.27	  	  South	  Carolina	  provided	  a	  slightly	  more	  detailed	  qualification:	  “The	  liberty	  of	  conscience	  …	  shall	  not	  be	  so	  construed	  as	  to	  excuse	  acts	  of	  licentiousness,	  or	  justify	  practices	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  peace	  or	  safety	  of	   this	   State.”28	  	   New	   York	   and	   Connecticut’s	   charters	   contained	   similar	   language.29	  	   And	  although	   Pennsylvania,	   Delaware,	   North	   Carolina	   and	   Virginia	   all	   protected	   religious	  exercise	  without	  explicit	  qualification,30	  when	  the	  United	  States	  Supreme	  Court	  got	  around	  to	   interpreting	  the	  substance	  of	  the	  federal	  provision	  (in	  the	  territorial	  context),	   it	  drew	  a	  bright	   line	   between	   “opinion”	   and	   “actions”	   in	   denying	  Mormon	   polygamy	   constitutional	  protection.31	  	  Even	  without	  getting	  into	  the	  Puritan	  theological	  literature	  on	  the	  state’s	  role	  in	   correcting	   “erroneous”	   conscience,32	  then,	   there	   is	   evidence	   enough	   to	   suggest	   that	   the	  Constitution’s	   ratifiers	   believed	   they	   had	   delegated	   religion	   and	   religious	   organizations	   a	  
limited	   sovereignty	   (much	  as	  both	   the	   federal	   and	   state	  governments	  enjoyed)	  within	   the	  new	  political	  structure.	  	  Within	  the	  “inward”	  sphere—the	  “care	  of	  men’s	  souls”—the	  state’s	  incompetence	  renders	  church	  authority	  absolute	  and	  plenary,	  but	  in	  the	  “outward”	  sphere	  of	  actions,	  religious	  tolerance	  is	  just	  one	  of	  many	  competing	  constitutional	  principles.	  	  	  This	   distinction	   is	   straightforward	   enough	   as	   applied	   to	   matters	   near	   the	   core	   of	  either	   theoretical	   sphere,	   but	   in	   practice	   the	   spheres	  may	  overlap	   a	   great	   deal—and,	   as	   I	  have	   suggested	   above,	   this	   is	   acutely	   the	   case	   with	   questions	   of	   church	   governance	   and	  institutional	  autonomy.	   	   	  To	  begin	  with,	   internal	   judgments	  about	   the	  person	  who	   is	   fit	   to	  lead	  or	  minister	  to	  a	  church	  are	  clearly	  beyond	  state	  competence.	  	  And	  Locke	  gives	  powerful	  structural	  reasons	  why	  the	  power	  of	  excommunication	  must	  also	  remain	  with	  the	  church	  if	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  See	  AKHIL	  REED	  AMAR,	  THE	  BILL	  OF	  RIGHTS:	  CONSTRUCTION	  AND	  RECONSTRUCTION	  42-­‐45	   (1998)	   (arguing	  that	   the	  original	  Establishment	  Clause	  announced	  a	  principle	  of	   federalism	   that	   reserved	  authority	  over	  religion	  to	  the	  state	  governments).	  26	  MASSACHUSETTS	  CONST.	  OF	  1780,	  pt.	  1,	  art.	  II	  (1780).	  27	  NEW	  HAMPSHIRE	  CONST.	   OF	   1784,	   pt.	   1,	   art.	   V	   (1784);	   NEW	   JERSEY	  CONST.	   OF	   1776,	   art.	   XIX	   (1776);	  MARYLAND	  CONST.	  OF	  1776,	   art.	   XXXIII	   (1776);	   CHARTER	  OF	  RHODE	   ISLAND	  AND	  PROVIDENCE	  PLANTATIONS	  (1663);	  GEORGIA	  CONST.	  OF	  1789,	  art.	  LVI	  (1789).	  28	  SOUTH	  CAROLINA	  CONST.	  OF	  1790,	  art.	  VIII,	  sec.	  1	  (1790).	  29	  NEW	  YORK	  CONST.	  OF	  1777,	  art.	  XXXVIII	  (1777);	  CONNECTICUT	  CONST.	  OF	  1818,	  art.	  I,	  sec.	  3.	  (1818).	  30	  PENNSYLVANIA	  CONST.	  OF	  1776,	  DEC.	  OF	  RTS.,	  art.	  II	  (1776);	  DELAWARE	  DEC.	  OF	  RTS.,	  sec.	  II	  (1776);	  NORTH	  CAROLINA	  CONST.	  OF	  1777,	  art.	  XIX	  (1777);	  VIRGINIA	  CONST.	  OF	  1776,	  sec.	  16	  (1776).	  31	  Reynolds	  v.	  United	  States,	  98	  U.S.	  145,	  165-­‐67	  (1878).	  32	  E.g.,	   JOHN	  COTTON,	  THE	  BLOUDY	  TENENT,	  WASHED,	  AND	  MADE	  WHITE	   IN	  THE	  BLOUDE	  OF	  THE	  LAMBE	  10-­‐13	  (London,	  1647);	  THE	  WESTMINSTER	  CONFESSION	  OF	  FAITH,	  chap.	  XX,	  sec.	  IV	  (1646).	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it	   is	   to	   continue	   to	   exist	   and	   carry	   on	   its	   “inward”	  missions.	   	   Enforcing	   these	   judgments,	  however,	   has	   very	   real	   consequences	   in	   the	   “outward”	   world,	   some	   which	   the	   state	  seemingly	  cannot	  tolerate	  in	  keeping	  with	  the	  general	  public	  interest.	   	   	  And	  so	  we	  seem	  to	  arrive	  at	  a	  justificatory	  impasse:	  	  The	  state	  is	  incompetent	  to	  make	  the	  religious	  judgments	  necessary	   to	   a	   church’s	   spiritual	   existence,	   yet	   it	   has	   the	   authority	   (and	   perhaps	   even	   a	  duty)	  not	  to	  tolerate	  outward	  threats	  to	  the	  public	  interest	  or	  order.	  	  I	  suggest	  that	  we	  can	  understand	  this	   impasse	  as	  arising	  out	  of	  a	   fundamental	   incommensurability	  between	   the	  religious	  and	  civil	   spheres	  of	  authority.	   	   It	   simply	  makes	  no	  sense,	   in	  other	  words,	   to	   talk	  about	  whether	  the	  state	  should	  or	  should	  not	  ‘tolerate’	  something	  that	  it	  is	  ‘incompetent’	  to	  change.	  	  	  All	  we	  can	  do,	  then,	  is	  make	  a	  choice	  about	  which	  sphere—inward	  or	  outward—a	  contested	  action	  falls	  into;	  a	  choice	  which	  determines	  whether	  that	  action	  is	  subject	  to	  civil	  jurisdiction.	   	   This,	   in	   fact,	   is	   precisely	   what	   Locke	   did	   in	   assessing	   the	   power	   of	  excommunication.33	  	   To	   better	   explain	   what	   this	   kind	   of	   incommensurability	   means,	   and	  what	  it	  entails	  in	  terms	  of	  choice	  and	  justification,	  I	  look	  to	  the	  more	  recent	  work	  of	  Thomas	  Kuhn.	  	   THOMAS	  KUHN,	  VALUE	  JUDGMENTS,	  AND	  THEORY	  CHOICE	  	  In	  his	  groundbreaking	  book	  The	  Structure	  of	  Scientific	  Revolutions,	  and	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  several	  later	  articles	  and	  speeches,	  Thomas	  Kuhn	  provided	  an	  account	  of	  how	  scientists	  justify	  their	  choices	  between	  incommensurable	  theoretical	  paradigms.34	  	  The	  problem	  itself	  arises	   out	   of	   Kuhn’s	   larger	   account	   of	   the	   nature	   of	   scientific	   progress,	   which	   he	   argued	  occurs	   in	   two	   fundamental	   phases.35	  	   The	   first	   and	   the	   most	   common	   phase	   he	   called	  “normal	  science,”	  in	  which	  everyday	  scientists	  conduct	  experiments	  and	  make	  incremental	  discoveries	  within	  the	  parameters	  of	  a	  generally	  accepted	  theoretical	  superstructure.36	  	  The	  second	  phase	  he	  called	  “paradigm	  change,”	  or	  moments	  of	  “scientific	  revolution,”	  when	  the	  overarching	  theoretical	  structure	  itself	  crumbles	  and	  a	  new	  set	  of	  meta-­‐explanations	  takes	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  See	  discussion	  note	  17	  supra;	  accord	  LOCKE,	  supra	  note	  9,	  at	  30-­‐31.	  34	  See	   THOMAS	   KUHN,	   THE	   STRUCTURE	   OF	   SCIENTIFIC	   REVOLUTIONS	   (3d.	   ed.,	   1962);	   Thomas	   S.	   Kuhn,	  
Objectivity,	   Value	   Judgment,	   and	   Theory	   Choice,	   in	   THOMAS	   S.	  KUHN,	  THE	  ESSENTIAL	  TENSION:	   SELECTED	  STUDIES	   IN	   SCIENTIFIC	   TRADITION	   AND	   CHANGE	   320	   (1977);	   Thomas	   S.	   	   Kuhn,	   Rationality	   and	   Theory	  
Choice,	  80	  J.	  OF	  PHIL.	  563,	  563	  (1983).	  	  Some	  of	  the	  material	  in	  this	  section	  appeared	  originally	  in	  Ian	  Bartrum,	   Constitutional	   Value	   Judgments	   and	   Interpretive	   Theory	   Choice,	   40	   FLA.	   ST.	   U.	   L.	   REV	   ___	  	  (forthcoming	  2013)	  available	  at:	  http://ssrn.com/abstract=2035936.	  35	  KUHN,	  STRUCTURE,	  supra	  note	  34,	  at	  10-­‐22.	  36	  Id.	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its	  place.37	  	  This	  conception	  of	  changing	  paradigms,	  however,	  creates	  a	  significant	  problem	  for	  those	  who	  believe	  science	  should	  advance	  in	  only	  rational,	  objectively	   justifiable	  ways.	  	  The	   problem	   is	   that,	   by	   definition,	   we	   cannot	   fully	   explain	   a	   paradigm	   changing	   insight	  within	   the	   terms	  of	   the	   existing	  paradigm.38	  	   Competing	   scientific	  paradigms	  are,	   in	  other	  words,	   fundamentally	   incommensurable—as	   Kuhn	   said,	   “when	   paradigms	   change,	   the	  world	  itself	  changes	  with	  them”—and	  thus	  occupy	  something	  like	  the	  separate	  conceptual	  spheres	  that	  Locke	  hypothesized	  for	  church	  and	  state.39	  In	  scientific	  practice,	  this	  kind	  of	  incommensurability	  has	  significant	  consequences	  for	  the	  rationality	  of	  individual	  theory	  choices.	  	  Most	  strikingly,	  the	  decision	  to	  abandon	  an	  old	  paradigm	  and	  adopt	  a	  new	  one	  cannot	  be	  ‘rational,’	  at	  least	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  being	  objectively	  justifiable	  within	  the	  conceptual	  structures	  available	  to	  the	  decision-­‐maker	  at	  the	  time	  she	  makes	   the	   decision.	   	   A	   scientist	  must,	   in	   other	  words,	   choose	   to	   adopt	   the	   new	  paradigm	  before	   she	   will	   have	   the	   conceptual	   apparatus	   necessary	   to	   evaluate	   it.	   	   While	   Kuhn	  recognized	   that	   such	   theory	   “choices”	  must	   inevitably	   rely,	   to	   some	  degree,	   on	   individual	  and	   idiosyncratic	   “judgments,”	   he	   never	   conceded	   that	   these	   choices	   were	   actually	  irrational.40	  	  Rather,	  he	  argued	  that	  an	  underlying	  set	  of	  shared	  scientific	  “values”—criteria	  he	   identified	   as	   accuracy,	   consistency,	   simplicity,	   scope,	   and	   fruitfulness—influence	   and	  inform	  the	  scientist’s	   choice	  between	  competing	  paradigms.41	  	   It	   is	  against	   these	  scientific	  values,	   then,	   that	   we	   can	   assess	   both	   the	   merits	   of	   a	   new	   theoretical	   paradigm	   and	   the	  quality	   of	   an	   individual	   scientist’s	   judgments.	   	   Thus,	   though	   ultimately	   idiosyncratic,	   a	  scientific	  value	   judgment	   is	  not	   inscrutable	   in	   the	  sense	   that	  a	  simple	  matter	  of	   taste	  may	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  As	  an	  example,	  think	  of	  the	  paradigm	  change	  that	  occurred	  when	  Nicolaus	  Copernicus	  moved	  the	  sun	   to	   center	   of	   the	   solar	   system.	   	   For	   centuries	   “normal	   scientists”	   had	   made	   gradual,	   and	  increasingly	   complex,	   improvements	   to	   the	   Ptolemaic	   model.	   	   Copernicus’s	   16th	   century	   insight	  changed	  the	  game	  entirely.	  38	  This	   incommensurability	   results	   from	   the	   different	   ways	   that	   competing	   theoretical	   paradigms	  group	   concepts	   together	   to	   form	   similarity	   relationships	   prior	   to	   naming	   those	   groupings	   or	  developing	  the	  related	  terminology	  that	  refines	  them.	  	  	  Kuhn	  offered	  a	  brief	  illustration:	  	   	  The	  Newtonian	  terms	  ‘force’	  and	  ‘mass’	  provide	  the	  simplest	  sort	  of	  example.	  	  One	  cannot	  learn	  how	  to	  use	  either	  one	  without	  simultaneously	  learning	  how	  to	  use	  the	  other.	   	   Nor	   can	   this	   part	   of	   the	   language-­‐acquisition	   process	   go	   forward	   without	  resort	   to	  Newton’s	  Second	  Law	  of	  Motion.	   	  Only	  with	   its	  aid	  can	  one	   learn	  how	  to	  pick	   out	  Newtonian	   forces	   and	  masses,	   how	   to	   attach	   the	   corresponding	   terms	   to	  nature.	  	  Kuhn,	  Rationality	  and	  Theory	  Choice,	  supra	  note	  34,	  at	  566.	  	  	  39	  KUHN,	  STRUCTURE,	  supra	  note	  34,	  at	  111.	  40	  Kuhn,	  Objectivity,	  Value	  Judgment,	  and	  Theory	  Choice,	  supra	  note	  34,	  at	  	  41	  Id.	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be—“I	  prefer	  apples	  to	  oranges”—but	  instead	  demands	  argument	  and	  justification	  relative	  to	  the	  basic	  aims	  of	  the	  larger	  scientific	  endeavor.42	  	  Indeed,	  it	  is	  this	  value	  transparency,	  as	  much	  as	  anything	  else,	  that	  makes	  a	  particular	  theory	  choice	  ‘scientific.’	  Kuhn	  himself	  often	  used	  the	  Copernican	  Revolution	  to	  illustrate	  different	  facets	  of	  his	  account,	  and	  it	  is	  a	  valuable	  example	  again	  here.	  	  This	  paradigm	  change	  began	  in	  1543	  when	  Nicolaus	  Copernicus	  published	  his	  De	  Revolutionibus,	  which	  argued	   that	   the	   time-­‐honored	  Ptolemaic	  model	   of	   the	   solar	   system—with	   the	   Earth	   firmly	   ensconced	   at	   its	   heart—was	  fundamentally	  wrong.43	  	  Copernicus’s	  revolutionary	  insight	  was,	  of	  course,	  to	  move	  the	  Sun	  to	  the	  center	  of	  the	  system.44	  	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  next	  century	  and	  a	  half,	  Copernicus’s	  model	   would	   replace	   Ptolemy’s	   across	   much	   of	   Europe,	   and	   new	   era	   of	   normal	   science	  astronomy	   was	   begun.45	  	   Initially,	   however,	   relatively	   few	   astronomers	   switched	   to	   the	  heliocentric	  account—and	  not	   just	  because	  it	  ran	  counter	  to	  Catholic	  doctrine.	   	   	  Rather,	  as	  Kuhn	  pointed	  out,	  only	  those	  scientists	  who	  placed	  particular	  emphasis	  on	  certain	  scientific	  values	   were	   likely	   to	   become	   Copernican	   early	   adopters.46	  	   Indeed,	   in	   assessing	   the	   new	  approach	  against	  his	  catalogue	  of	  scientific	  values,	  Kuhn	  argued	  that	  the	  heliocentric	  model	  “was	   not	  more	  accurate	   than	   the	   Ptolemy’s	   until	   drastically	   revised	   by	   [Johannes]	  Kepler	  more	  than	  sixty	  years	  after	  Copernicus’s	  death.”47	  	  And,	  while	  both	  models	  were	  internally	  
consistent,	   the	   heliocentric	   system	   contravened	   “a	   tight-­‐knit	   body	   of	   [other	   scientific]	  doctrine	  which	  explained,	  among	  other	  things,	  how	  stones	  fall,	  how	  water	  pumps	  function,	  and	  why	  the	  clouds	  move	  slowly	  across	  the	  sky.”48	  	  In	  fact,	  if	  Kepler	  himself	  had	  not	  placed	  much	   greater	  weight	   on	   the	   value	   of	   simplicity—where	  Copernicus’s	  model	  was	   the	   clear	  winner—the	  heliocentric	  paradigm	  change	  might	  not	  have	  come	  until	  much	  later.	  In	  the	  sixteenth	  century	  scientific	  peer	  review	  was	  not	  what	  it	  is	  today,	  but	  Kepler	  was	  nonetheless	   quite	   transparent	   about	   the	   value	   judgments	   that	   led	   him	   to	   choose	   the	  Copernican	  model.	   	   	   	   Indeed,	   roughly	  a	  decade	  after	  his	  seminal	  Astronomia	  Nova,49	  which	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Id.	  at	  337-­‐39.	  	  While	  we	  are	  unlikely	  to	  have	  a	  useful	  debate	  about	  which	  fruit	  tastes	  better,	  we	  can	  certainly	   have	   a	   fruitful	   discussion	   about	   which	   better	   prevents	   scurvy—if	   that	   is	   something	   we	  value.	  	  On	  the	  commensurable	  ground	  of	  “scurvy	  prevention,”	  then,	  we	  can	  make	  something	  like	  the	  kind	  of	  rational	  value	  judgment	  that	  informs	  scientific	  theory	  choice.	  43	  NICOLAUS	   COPERNICUS,	   DE	   REVOLUTIONIBUS	   (ON	   THE	   REVOLUTIONS	   OF	   THE	   HEAVENLY	   BODIES)	   (Edward	  Rosen	  trans.,	  London,	  1972)	  (1543).	  44	  Id.	  45	  See	  generally	  2A	  THE	  GENERAL	  HISTORY	  OF	  ASTRONOMY	  220-­‐275	  (R.	  Taton	  &	  C.	  Wilson,	  eds.	  1989).	  46	  Kuhn,	  Objectivity,	  Value	  Judgment	  and	  Theory	  Choice,	  supra	  note	  34,	  at	  323.	  47	  Id.	  (emphasis	  added).	  48	  Id.	  	  49	  JOHANNES	  KEPLER,	  NEW	  ASTRONOMY	  (William	  H.	  Donahue,	  trans.,	  Cambridge	  1992)	  (1609).	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announced	   the	  principles	   of	   elliptical	   orbits	   and	   equal	   areas,	   he	  published	   two	   additional	  books—Epitome	  of	  Copernican	  Astronomy	  and	  Harmonies	  of	  the	  World—dedicated	  in	  part	  to	  explaining	   his	   preference	   for	   the	   heliocentric	   paradigm.50	  	   Chief	   among	   the	   idiosyncratic	  factors	  that	   influenced	  his	  choice	  was	  a	  profound	  reverence	  for	  the	  Sun,	  which	  he	  thought	  “if	   not	   the	   king,	   at	   least	   the	   queen	   of	   intellectual	   fire.”51	  	   If	   for	   no	   other	   reason	   than	   “the	  virtue	   of	   his	   dignity	   and	   power”	   the	   Sun	   deserved	   to	   occupy	   the	   central	   spot—the	   “first	  mover”—in	  the	  celestial	  scheme.52	  	  But	  in	  truth	  this	  was	  not	  the	  only,	  nor	  perhaps	  even	  the	  initial,	   judgment	   to	   influence	  his	   decision.53	  	  He	   also	   believed	   that	   the	  divine	   order	   of	   the	  universe	  must	  be	  simple	  and	  in	  concord	  with	  the	  a	  priori	  ordering	  of	  the	  human	  intellect.54	  	  The	  maker	  of	   the	  heavens	  was	  also	   the	  maker	  of	  our	  minds,	   and	   thus	   “the	   relation	  of	   the	  single	  planets’	  revolutions	   in	  place	  around	  the	  sun	  to	   the	  unvarying	  rotation	  of	   the	  sun	   in	  the	   central	   place	   of	   the	   whole	   system	   …	   is	   the	   same	   as	   the	   relation	   of	   …	   the	   manifold	  discourses	   of	   ratiocination	   to	   the	  most	   simple	   intellection	   of	   the	  mind.”55	  	   Indeed,	   Kepler	  argued	  that	  this	  universal	  simplicity	  so	  matched	  our	  inherent	  aesthetic	  preferences	  that	  the	  ratios	  of	  mass	  and	  distance	  between	  celestial	  bodies	  actually	  correspond	  to	  the	  wavelengths	  of	  basic	  musical	  harmony.56	  	  It	  was	  thus	  the	  fundamental	  simplicity	  of	  heliocentricity	  that,	  in	  large	  part,	  guided	  Kepler’s	  adoption	  of	  the	  Copernican	  system.	  Kepler’s	   value	   judgment	   in	   favor	   of	   the	   heliocentric	   paradigm	  was	   thus	   undeniably	  subjective	  in	  important	  ways.	  	  He	  placed	  great	  emphasis	  on	  the	  value	  of	  simplicity—and	  the	  related	   idea	   of	   harmony—perhaps	   for	   reasons	   we	   might	   not	   consider	   strictly	   ‘scientific’	  today.	  	   	  But	  we	  do	  well	  to	  remember	  that	  ‘science’	  in	  the	  16th	  century	  was	  firmly	  rooted	  in	  religious	  conceptions	  of	   the	  natural	  order,	   and	   the	  preference	   for	  a	   simple,	  elegant	  divine	  architecture	  was	  hardly	  out	  of	  keeping	  with	  scientific	  norms.	  	  Indeed,	  a	  few	  centuries	  earlier	  William	  of	  Ockham	  had	  elevated	   the	  principle	  of	  parsimony	   into	   something	  of	   a	   scientific	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  JOHANNES	   KEPLER,	   EPITOME	   OF	   COPERNICAN	   ASTRONOMY	   &	   HARMONIES	   OF	   THE	   WORLD	   (Charles	   Glenn	  Wallis,	  trans.,	  Prometheus	  1995)	  (1619,	  1621).	  51	  Id.	  at	  245.	  52	  EDWIN	  ARTHUR	  BURTT,	  THE	  METAPHYSICAL	  FOUNDATIONS	  OF	  MODERN	  SCIENCE	  59	  (Dover	  ed.,	  2003)	  (1924)	  (quoting	  a	  “fragment”	  found	  in	  Kepler’s	  “miscellaneous	  remains”).	  53	  See	  ROBERT	  S.	  WESTMAN,	  THE	  COPERNICAN	  QUESTION:	  PROGNOSTICATION,	  SKEPTICISM,	  AND	  CELESTIAL	  ORDER	  318	  (2011)	  (arguing	  that	  the	  Sun’s	  dignity	  and	  centrality	  allowed	  Kepler	  to	  begin	  to	  break	  down	  the	  separation	  between	  Aristotle’s	   formal	   causes—in	  effect,	   combining	   the	  efficient	  and	   final	   causes	  of	  planetary	  movement).	  54	  KEPLER,	  EPITOME	  &	  HARMONIES,	  supra	  note	  50,	  at	  244.	  55	  Id.	  56	  Id.	  at	  183-­‐99.	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axiom.57	  	  With	   this	   in	  mind,	  Kepler’s	   early	   decision	   to	   adopt	   and	   improve	   the	   Copernican	  model,	   though	   idiosyncratic,	  was	   hardly	   beyond	   the	   pale	   of	   the	   larger	   canon	   of	   scientific	  values.	  	  While	  other	  scientists	  might	  not	  have	  shared	  his	  judgment	  about	  value	  of	  simplicity	  or	  the	  merits	  of	  heliocentrism,	  they	  were	  at	  least	  able	  to	  discuss	  and	  evaluate	  the	  question	  on	   the	   commensurable	   ground	   of	   broadly	   shared	   scientific	   goals.	   	   And	   it	   is	   this	  commensurable	   ground—this	   foundation	  of	   shared,	   overarching	   criteria	  undergirding	   the	  entire	  scientific	  endeavor—that	  provides	  the	  space	  to	  debate	  and	  decide	  the	  proper	  balance	  of	   incommensurable	   theoretical	   approaches	  within	   the	   progress	   of	   ‘science’	  writ	   large.	   	   I	  suggest	  below	   that	  a	   similar	   space	  exists	   in	  our	   constitutional	  practice—a	  constitutionally	  
commensurable	   ground—where	   we	   can	   and	   must	   decide	   the	   appropriate	   relationship	  between	  incommensurable	  constitutional	  principles.	  	  CONSTITUTIONAL	  COMMENSURABILITY	  	  If	  we	  accept	  that	  at	  least	  some	  features	  of	  Locke’s	  “inward”	  and	  “outward”	  spheres	  are	  incommensurable—e.g.,	   the	  former	  speaks	   in	  terms	  of	  state	   incompetence,	  while	  the	   latter	  contemplates	   religious	   tolerance—then	   I	   suggest	  we	  must	   also	  accept	   that	   cases	   in	  which	  the	   spheres	   overlap	   may	   require	   individual	   and	   idiosyncratic	   choices	   of	   the	   kind	   Kuhn	  identifies.	  	  That	  is,	  we	  may	  simply	  have	  to	  choose	  which	  theoretical	  sphere	  or	  paradigm	  best	  applies	  to	  the	  specific	  facts	  and	  questions	  a	  given	  issue	  presents.	  	  Put	  in	  the	  concrete	  terms	  of	   the	  ministerial	   exception,	  we	  must	   choose	  which	   church	   governance	   decisions	  we	  will	  treat	   as	   part	   of	   the	   inward	   realm	  of	   state	   ‘incompetence,’	   and	  which	   are	   outward	   actions	  that	  are	  subject	   to	  state	   ‘toleration.’	   	   	  After	  all,	   it	   is	  only	  after	  we	  choose	   to	  view	  a	  church	  decision	   as	   an	   outward	   action	   that	   it	   even	   becomes	   possible	   to	  make	   a	   normative	   claim	  about	  whether	   the	   state	   should	   tolerate	   it.	   	   I	   argue	   below	   that	  we	  must	  make	   this	   initial	  choice	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  underlying	  constitutional	  values—by	  which	   I	  mean	  the	  purposes	  or	  functions	  we	  broadly	  believe	  the	  Constitution	  serves	  in	  our	  democratic	  system.	  	  	  Like	  Kuhn’s	  objective	   criteria,	   these	   values	   serve	   as	   the	   constitutionally	   commensurable	   ground	   on	  which	  we	  can	  assess	  and	  justify	  choices	  between	  incommensurable	  theoretical	  paradigms.	  	  Relying	   on	   four	   constitutional	   values	   that	   I	   have	   identified	   and	   defended	   elsewhere,58	  I	  contend	  in	  this	  final	  section	  that	  we	  should	  treat	  intentional	  acts	  of	  discrimination	  as	  a	  part	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  In	  truth,	  Ockham	  never	  stated	  his	  namesake	  logical	  “razor”	  in	  the	  terms	  often	  attributed	  to	  him.	  	  A	  fairly	   representative	   quotation—“Frusta	   fit	   per	   plura,	   quod	   potest	   fieri	   per	   pauciora”—does,	  however,	  appear	  in	  his	  Summa	  Totius	  Logicae.	   	  W.	  M.	  Thorburn,	  The	  Myth	  of	  Occam’s	  Razor,	  27	  MIND	  345,	  351	  (1918).	  58	  Bartrum,	  Constitutional	  Value	  Judgments,	  supra	  note	  12,	  at	  ___.	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of	   the	   outward	   sphere,	   which	   the	   state	   may	   or	   may	   not	   tolerate.	   	   Then,	   using	   the	   basic	  modalities	  of	  constitutional	  argument,	   I	  conclude	  that	  racial	  discrimination	  in	  particular	   is	  the	  kind	  of	  outward	  action	  we	  should	  not	  tolerate.	  	  Before	   presenting	   my	   working	   list	   of	   ‘constitutional	   values,’	   it	   is	   worth	   saying	   a	  clarifying	   word	   about	   the	   role	   these	   values	   play	   in	   a	   choice	   between	   incommensurable	  paradigms.	  	  In	  keeping	  with	  Kuhn’s	  insight,	  these	  values	  operate	  to	  influence	  such	  a	  choice,	  but	   they	   cannot	   determine	   it. 59 	  	   Thus,	   there	   is	   no	   objectively	   ‘correct’	   emphasis	   or	  combination	   of	   the	   values	   germane	   to	   any	   particular	   theory	   choice—there	   is,	   in	   Kuhn’s	  terms	   no	   universal	   “algorithm”	   by	   which	   the	   values	   lead	   ineluctably	   to	   a	   given	   choice.60	  	  Indeed,	  the	  values	  themselves	  may	  be	  incommensurable	  with	  each	  other	  in	  important	  ways;	  but	  Kuhn	  never	  claimed	  that	  we	  could	  objectively	  justify	  the	  emphasis	  placed	  on	  one	  value	  over	   another	   in	   any	   given	   context.	   	   These	   are	   ultimately	   idiosyncratic	   and	   subjective	  preferences—analogous	   to	   Kepler’s	   desire	   for	   simplicity—and	   so	   here	   the	  commensurability	   regressions	  must	  end	  and	  our	   justificatory	   spades	  are	   turned.61	  	   In	   this	  sense,	   Kuhn’s	   point	   is	   that,	   like	   Larry	   Alexander’s	   liberalism,	   objective	   or	   rational	  justifications	   cannot	   go	   all	   the	   way	   down;	   somewhere	   we	  must	   hit	   subjective	   bedrock.62	  	  What	   Kuhn	   does	   claim	   as	   ‘objective’	   (in	   the	   sense	   of	   being	   broadly	   shared)	   is	   the	   list	   of	  values	  itself.	  	  We	  must	  be	  able	  to	  justify	  a	  particular	  value’s	  place	  on	  the	  list—in	  this	  case	  its	  ‘constitutional	  legitimacy’—by	  reference	  to	  its	  entrenched	  place	  in	  constitutional	  argument.	  	  We	  must	   be	   able	   to	   justify,	   in	   other	   words,	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   particular	   value	   using	   the	  commensurable	  terms	  of	  the	  constitutional	  paradigm.	  	  This	  is	  what	  I	  mean	  when	  I	  argue	  for	  a	  realm	  of	  constitutional	  commensurability.	  In	   previous	   work	   I	   have	   identified	   a	   decidedly	   nonexclusive	   list	   of	   four	   central	  constitutional	   values:	   constraint,	   flexibility,	   representation,	  and	   identity.63	  	   Again,	   the	  most	  important	  feature	  of	  this	  list	  is	  not	  that	  it	  captures	  the	  only	  constitutional	  values	  that	  exist,	  but	  rather	  that	   the	  values	   it	  does	  capture	  are	  broadly	  shared—this	   is	  what	  allows	  them	  to	  serve	   as	   something	   like	   objective	   criteria.64	  	   With	   this	   in	   mind,	   I	   derived	   my	   list	   of	   four	  values	  from	  central	  texts	  in	  the	  constitutional	  canon,	  which	  I	  contend	  identify	  areas	  of	  broad	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  Kuhn,	  Objectivity,	  Value	  Judgment,	  and	  Theory	  Choice,	  supra	  note	  34,	  at	  331.	  60	  Id.	  at	  329.	  61 	  The	   reference	   is	   to	   Ludwig	   Wittgenstein’s	   bedrock	   description	   of	   rule	   following.	   	   LUDWIG	  WITTGENSTEIN,	  PHILOSOPHICAL	  INVESTIGATIONS	  §	  217	  (G.E.M.	  Anscombe,	  trans.,	  3d	  ed.	  1958).	  	  	  	  62	  Alexander,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  625.	  63	  Bartrum,	  Constitutional	  Value	  Judgments,	  supra	  note	  12,	  at	  ___.	  64	  Id.	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constitutional	  convergence.65	  	  To	  summarize	  briefly,	  constitutional	  constraint	  suggests	  that	  the	  document	  serves	  the	  purpose	  of	  restraining	  or	  limiting	  government	  actors,	  including	  the	  Court.66	  	  Constitutional	  flexibility,	  which	  often	  exists	  in	  tension	  with	  constraint,	  suggests	  that	  we	  value	  a	  longstanding	  and	  stable	  charter	  written	  in	  broad	  terms	  that	  can	  adapt	  to	  rapidly	  changing	  cultural	  and	  technological	  circumstances.67	  	  We	  also	  value	  the	  document	  as	  a	  plan	  of	   constitutional	   representation	   that	  manifests	   self-­‐governance	  by	  giving	  us	   roughly	   equal	  kinds	   of	   access	   to	   our	   political	   institutions	   and	   community.68	  	   Finally,	   we	   look	   to	   the	  Constitution	  as	  a	  source	  of	  national	   identity,	  which	   is	   to	  say	  that	  “Americanness”	   is	  not	  an	  ethnicity	  as	  much	  as	  it	  is	  a	  shared	  commitment	  to	  particular	  ideas	  about	  the	  nature	  and	  role	  of	  legitimate	  government.69	  	  	  Much	   as	   scientists	   evaluate	   the	   merits	   of	   incommensurable	   theoretical	   paradigms	  against	   larger	   scientific	   values	   and	   purposes,	   constitutional	   lawyers	   can	   use	   these	   larger	  constitutional	   values	   to	   guide	   their	   choices	   between	   incommensurable	   principles.	   	   In	  deciding	   the	   particular	   question	   of	   church	   governance	   and	   the	   limits	   of	   independent	  religious	  sovereignty,	   I	   suggest	   that	   three	  of	   these	   four	  values—constraint,	  representation,	  and	  identity—are	  particularly	  relevant	  and	  important.	  	  Before	  assessing	  these	  values	  in	  the	  context	   of	   the	   ministerial	   exception,	   however,	   I	   want	   to	   be	   clear	   again	   about	   the	  argumentative	  process	  I	  propose.	  	  It	  is	  a	  two-­‐step	  process:	  (1)	  We	  must	  choose	  what	  kind	  of	  (if	   any)	   church	   governance	   decisions	   to	   treat	   as	   “outward”	   actions	   subject	   to	   state	  jurisdiction;	  and	  (2)	  If	  we	  choose	  treat	  a	  particular	  decision	  as	  within	  the	  state’s	  jurisdiction,	  we	  must	  then	  decide	  whether	  it	  is	  something	  the	  state	  should	  nonetheless	  tolerate.	   	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  ministerial	  exception,	  the	  first	  question	  is	  whether	  we	  should	  treat	  church	  hiring	  decisions	  that	  discriminate	  against	  individuals	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  race,	  gender,	  or	  disability	  as	  “inward”	  judgments	  or	  “outward”	  acts.	  	  The	  second	  question,	  if	  we	  get	  there,	  is	  whether	  the	  state	  should	  tolerate	  these	  acts	  in	  the	  name	  of	  religious	  freedom.	  With	   that	   said,	   I	   turn	   to	   the	   first	  question,	  which	  explores	   the	   limits	  of	   independent	  religious	   sovereignty.	   	   As	   I	   have	   said,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   church	   governance	   decisions	   Locke’s	  “inward”	  and	  “outward”	  spheres	  seem	  to	  overlap,	  or	  are	  bound	  up,	  in	  ways	  that	  force	  a	  basic	  
choice	  about	  the	  sphere	  to	  which	  a	  particular	  decision	  belongs.	  	  And	  I	  hope	  I	  have	  made	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  Id.	  66	  I	  identified	  this	  value	  in	  Marbury	  v.	  Madison	  and	  Holmes’s	  dissent	  in	  Lochner.	  	  Id.	  at	  ___.	  67	  I	  derived	  this	  value	  from	  McCulloch	  v.	  Maryland.	  	  Id.	  at	  ___.	  68	  I	   identified	  this	  in	  John	  Hart	  Ely’s	  Democracy	  and	  Distrust	  and	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  of	  Education.	   	  Id.	  at	  ___.	  69	  Here	  I	  looked	  to	  the	  Declaration	  of	  Independence	  and	  the	  Gettysburg	  Address.	  	  Id.	  at	  ___.	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case	  that	  the	  best	  way	  to	  make	  or	  evaluate	  such	  a	  choice	  is	  by	  reference	  to	  our	  underlying	  constitutional	  values.	  	  	  The	  first	  such	  value	  this	  question	  invokes	  is	  constitutional	  constraint.	  	  Ours	  is	  a	  liberal	  democracy	  committed	  to	  the	  principle	  of	  limited	  state	  authority	  bound	  by	  structural	  and	  substantive	  checks	  on	  political	  power.	   	  Among	  the	  most	   important	  of	   these	  constitutional	  checks	  are	   the	  guarantee	  of	   free	  religious	  exercise	  and	   the	  promise	  of	   state	  disestablishment.	   	   And,	   structurally	   speaking,	   one	   of	   the	   most	   important	   features	   of	  disestablishment	   is	   that	   a	   church	   must	   be	   able	   to	   constitute	   itself—both	   in	   terms	   of	  membership	  and	   leadership—without	  state	  mandates	  or	   interference.	   	   It	   is	   for	   these	  very	  reasons	  that	  Locke	  himself	  reserved	  the	  power	  of	  excommunication	  to	  the	  church;	  even	   if	  he	  recognized	  that,	  at	  least	  implicitly,	  formal	  exercises	  of	  that	  power	  amount	  to	  “outward”	  acts.70	  	  Likewise,	  many	  of	  the	  framers	  and	  ratifiers—Madison	  and	  Jefferson	  most	  notably—argued	  that	  the	  state	  lacks	  the	  power	  or	  authority	  to	  intervene	  in	  basic	  questions	  of	  church	  governance.	   Thus	   the	   constitutional	   value	   of	   constraint	   almost	   certainly	   counsels,	   as	   a	  general	   matter,	   that	   we	   treat	   church	   governance	   questions	   as	   belonging	   to	   the	   “inward”	  sphere	  of	  religious	  judgment.	  	  But,	  in	  certain	  cases,	  Locke	  himself	  carved	  out	  exceptions	  to	  the	  general	  rule,	  and	  it	   is	  certainly	  worth	  examining	  the	  character	  of	  those	  exceptions	  in	  a	  little	  more	  depth.	  Leaving	   aside	   his	   exclusion	   of	   atheists,	   which	   raises	   questions	   too	   complex	   and	  profound	   for	   this	   limited	  space,	  Locke	   identified	   three	  species	  of	   church	  doctrine	   that	   the	  state	   need	   not	   tolerate.71	  	   As	   discussed	   above,	   these	   included	   elevating	   church	   members	  “above	   other	   mortals,”	   delivering	   members	   up	   to	   the	   “protection	   and	   service	   of	   another	  prince,”	  and	  preaching	  “opinions	  contrary	  to	  human	  society,	  or	  to	  those	  rules	  necessary	  to	  the	   preservation	   of	   civil	   society.”72	  	   The	   first	   of	   Locke’s	   exceptions	   reflects	   a	   fundamental	  liberal	  commitment	  to	  basic	  human	  equality,	  which	  also	  underlies	  the	  constitutional	  values	  of	  representation	  and,	  in	  the	  American	  case,	  identity.	  	  	  Indeed,	  it	  is	  this	  same	  commitment	  to	  equality	  that	  provides	  the	  foundation	  for	  much	  of	  Locke’s	  political	  philosophy,	  including	  his	  larger	   views	   on	   religious	   tolerance.73	  	   The	   second	   exception	   requires	   citizens	   to	   reserve	  their	   political	   allegiance	   to	   the	   state,	   which	   clearly	   embodies	   the	   constitutional	   value	   of	  
identity	  and	  the	  need	  for	  cohesion	  in	  a	  political	  community.	   	   	  The	  final	  exception	  explicitly	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  LOCKE,	  supra	  note	  ___,	  at	  30-­‐31.	  71	  Note	  again	  that	  Locke’s	  use	  of	  the	  term	  “tolerate”	  forcefully	  implies	  that	  these	  questions	  fall	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  state	  supervision.	  	  LOCKE,	  supra	  note	  9,	  at	  30-­‐31.	  	  	  72	  Id.	  	  73	  E.g.,	  JOHN	  LOCKE,	  SECOND	  TREATISE	  OF	  GOVERNMENT,	  CHAPS.	  VIII-­‐IX	  52	  -­‐65	  C.B.	  Macpherson	  ed.,	  Hackett	  (1980)	  (1690).	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defers	   to	   the	   rule	  of	   law	  and	   the	  need	   for	  public	  order.	   	  Again,	   this	  deference	   reflects	   the	  underlying	  constitutional	  values	  of	  equal	  representation	  and	   identity,	   inasmuch	  as	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  manifests	  the	  American	  commitment	  to	  equal	  membership	  and	  accountability	  in	  the	  political	  community.	  	  	  Taken	  together,	  Locke’s	  exceptions	  suggest	  that,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  liberal	  checks	   on	   state	   power	   over	   religion,	   we	   arrive	   at	   illiberal	   bedrock	   when	   the	   state	   must	  enforce	  some	  sense	  of	  the	  equality	  and	  inclusiveness	  that	  characterize	  the	  larger	  American	  political	   project—concepts	   embodied	   in	   the	   constitutional	   values	   of	   representation	   and	  
identity.	  Two	   letters	   George	   Washington	   wrote	   in	   the	   first	   year	   of	   his	   Presidency	   reflect	   a	  similar	  “e	  pluribus	  unum”	  view	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  diverse	  religious	  groups	  and	  the	  larger	   political	   community.	   	   In	   the	   first	   letter,	   he	   welcomed	   Roman	   Catholics	   as	   equal	  participants	   in	   the	   American	   endeavor:	   	   “As	  mankind	   becomes	  more	   liberal	   they	   will	   be	  more	   apt	   to	   allow	   that	   all	   those	   who	   conduct	   themselves	   as	   worthy	   members	   of	   the	  
community	   are	   equally	   entitled	   to	   the	   protection	   of	   civil	   government.	   	   I	   hope	   ever	   to	   see	  America	   as	   among	   the	   foremost	   nations	   in	   examples	   of	   justice	   and	   liberality.”74	  	   He	  expressed	  similar	  sentiments	  in	  a	  response	  to	  the	  Hebrew	  Congregation	  in	  Newport,	  Rhode	  Island,	  and	  again	  suggested	  that	  the	  only	  condition	  placed	  on	  free	  religious	  exercise	  was	  a	  dedication	   to	   the	   shared	   political	   vision:	   “[T]he	   Government	   of	   the	   United	   States,	   which	  gives	   bigotry	   no	   sanction,	   to	   persecution	   no	   assistance,	   requires	   only	   that	   they	   who	   live	  
under	   its	  protection	  should	  demean	  themselves	  as	  good	  citizens	   in	   giving	   it	   on	   all	   occasions	  their	   effectual	   support.”75	  	   	   In	   these	   and	   others	   correspondences	  Washington	   repeats	   the	  basic	   Lockean	   premise:	   The	   very	   concept	   of	   equality	   and	   inclusion	   that	   gives	   rise	   to	  religious	   freedom	   also	   serves	   as	   a	   general	   limit	   on	   the	   kinds	   of	   religious	   judgments	   and	  actions	  we	  should	  consider	  “inward”	  and	  thus	  beyond	  state	  competence.76	  	  Both	  Locke	  and	  Washington	   seem	   to	   suggest,	   then,	   that	   the	   constitutional	   values	   of	   representation	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  Letter	   from	   George	  Washington	   to	   the	   Roman	   Catholics	   of	   the	   United	   States	   of	   America,	   (March,	  1790)	   in	  GEORGE	  WASHINGTON	   PAPERS	   AT	   THE	   LIBRARY	   OF	   CONGRESS,	   1741-­‐1799:	   SERIES	   2	   LETTERBOOKS	  
available	  at:	  http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/P?mgw:8:./temp/~ammem_WytK::.	  75	  Letter	  from	  George	  Washington	  to	  the	  Hebrew	  Congregation	  at	  Newport,	  Rhode	  Island,	   (August	  17,	  1790)	   in	  GEORGE	  WASHINGTON	   PAPERS	   AT	   THE	   LIBRARY	   OF	   CONGRESS,	   1741-­‐1799:	   SERIES	   2	   LETTERBOOKS	  
available	  at:	  http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/P?mgw:3:./temp/~ammem_H6ix::.	  76	  For	   other	   illustrative	   letters,	   see	   Letter	   from	   George	  Washington	   to	   the	   Hebrew	   Congregation	   of	  
Savannah,	  Georgia	  (May,	  1790)	  in	  GEORGE	  WASHINGTON	  PAPERS	  AT	  THE	  LIBRARY	  OF	  CONGRESS,	  1741-­‐1799:	  SERIES	   2	   LETTERBOOKS	   available	   at:	   	   http://	   memory.loc.gov/	   cgi-­‐bin/	   query/	   P?mgw:1:./	   temp/	  ~ammem_5VfM::;	  Letter	   from	  George	  Washington	  to	  the	  Hebrew	  Congregations	   in	  Philadelphia,	  New	  
York,	   Charleston	   and	   Richmond	   (January,	   1790)	   in	   GEORGE	   WASHINGTON	   PAPERS	   AT	   THE	   LIBRARY	   OF	  CONGRESS,	   1741-­‐1799:	   SERIES	   2	   LETTERBOOKS	   available	   at:	   http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-­‐bin/query/P?mgw:8:./temp/~ammem_ZBE8::.	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identity	  should	  temper,	  if	  not	  outright	  limit,	  the	  value	  of	  constraint	  when	  we	  choose	  whether	  particular	  church	  decisions	  belong	  to	  the	  “inward”	  or	  “outward”	  spheres.	  	  	  Again,	  however,	  I	  should	  be	  clear	  that	  these	  are	  idiosyncratic	  value	  judgments	  made	  by	  individual	  men	  about	  the	  appropriate	  scope	  of	  religious	  autonomy;	  they	  in	  no	  way	  preclude	  others	  from	  making	  different—and	  equally	  legitimate—value	  judgments	  about	  the	  limits	  of	  state	  jurisdiction	  in	  such	  cases.	  My	   own	   judgment,	   however,	   is	   quite	   similar	   to	   that	   which	   Locke	  made	   in	   A	   Letter	  
Concerning	   Toleration.	   	   The	   power	   of	   excommunication—even	   inasmuch	   as	   it	   is	   the	  “outward”	   enforcement	   of	   an	   “inward”	   judgment—remains	   beyond	   state	   competence.	  	  	  Excommunication	  is	  simply	  too	  bound	  up	  with	  internal	  church	  doctrines	  and	  judgments	  to	  admit	  of	   state	  supervision,	  and,	   structurally	  speaking,	  external	  oversight	  of	   religious	  bona	  fides	   threatens	   a	   church’s	   very	   existence.	   	   	   Like	   Locke,	   however,	   I	   understand	   the	   term	  excommunication	  here	  in	  somewhat	  narrow	  terms—it	  is	  enforcement	  of	  the	  judgment	  that	  an	   individual	   has	   not	   honored	   his	   or	   her	   religious	   obligations	   to	   a	   church	   community.	  	  Translated	  into	  the	  context	  of	  ministerial	  hiring,	  this	  means	  only	  that	  governance	  decisions	  based	  on	  a	  candidate’s	  religious	  beliefs	  or	  practices	  are	  beyond	  state	  competence.	  	  Decisions	  made	  on	  other	  grounds—a	  candidate’s	  race,	  gender,	  sexual	  orientation	  or	  disability—do	  not	  fall	  into	  the	  “excommunication”	  category.	  	  Rather,	  the	  constitutional	  values	  of	  representation	  and	   identity	   suggest	   that	   we	   should	   treat	   these	   latter	   sorts	   of	   decisions—decisions	   that	  threaten	   the	   basic	   equality	   and	   inclusiveness	   central	   to	   our	   polity—as	   “outward”	   actions	  that	   fall	   within	   the	   state’s	   supervisory	   jurisdiction.	   	   Again,	   others	   may	   make	   a	   different	  value	   judgment	   here.	   	   Indeed,	   one	   might	   quite	   reasonably	   conclude	   that	   leadership	  questions	   regarding	   race	   and	   gender	   (for	   example)	   are	   themselves	   so	   intimately	   tied	   to	  inward	  religious	   judgments	   that	  we	  must	  here	  constrain	   the	  civil	   jurisdiction,	   and	  so	  may	  reject	  egalitarianism	  in	  favor	  of	  some	  other	  limit	  on	  religious	  sovereignty.	  	  It	  is,	  however,	  my	  judgment—and	  I	   think	   I	  am	   in	  good	  company	  with	  Locke—that,	  when	  church	  governance	  decisions	   undermine	   the	   constitutional	   representation	   or	   equality	   ethic,	   they	   must	   fall	  within	  the	  ambit	  of	  state	  regulation.	  With	   this	   initial	   paradigm	   choice	   now	  made,	   we	   can	  move	   on	   to	   consider	   whether	  there	   are	   good	   reasons	   that	   the	   state	   should	   nonetheless	   tolerate	   church	   governance	  decisions	   that	   it	   has	   jurisdiction	   to	   proscribe.	   	   In	  making	   this	   second	   kind	   of	   judgment,	   I	  suggest	  that	  we	  can	  rely	  on	  the	  same	  methodologies	  that	  inform	  our	  other	  efforts	  to	  resolve	  constitutional	  problems.	  	  Here,	  as	  elsewhere,	  I	  suggest	  that	  Philip	  Bobbitt	  has	  provided	  the	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most	   useful	   account	   of	   these	   methodologies. 77 	  	   Bobbitt	   identifies	   six	   “modalities”	   of	  constitutional	   argument	   alive	   in	   our	   current	   practice—historical,	   textual,	   structural,	  doctrinal,	  prudential,	  and	  ethical—and	  contends	  that	  we	  use	  these	  accepted	  forms	  to	  make	  and	  defend	  assertions	  of	  constitutional	  meaning	  in	  contested	  cases.78	  	  In	  earlier	  work,	  I	  have	  made	  historical,	  ethical,	  and	  doctrinal	  arguments	  concluding	   that,	  when	  religious	   freedom	  conflicts	   with	   the	   constitutional	   proscription	   of	   racial	   discrimination,	   it	   is	   the	   former	  principle	   that	   must	   give	   way.79	  	   To	   briefly	   summarize	   those	   claims,	   the	   history	   of	   our	  national	   struggle	   against	   black	   slavery,	   the	   Civil	  War,	   and	   the	   framing	   of	   the	   Fourteenth	  Amendment	  (particularly	  the	  effort	  to	  repudiate	  religious	  slave	  codes)	  all	  suggest	  that,	  since	  1867	  at	  least,	  a	  fundamental	  commitment	  to	  racial	  nondiscrimination	  now	  tempers	  all	  other	  constitutional	  principles.80	  	  Our	  constitutional	  ethos,	  while	  not	  quite	  prepared	  to	  absorb	  the	  Radical	   Republicans’	   ideals	   in	   the	   latter	   nineteenth	   century,	   came	   to	   embody	   this	  nondiscrimination	   principle	   through	   the	   Civil	   Rights	   Revolution	   of	   the	   mid-­‐twentieth	  century.81	  	   And	   finally	   there	   is	   fairly	   recent	   constitutional	   doctrine—the	   Supreme	   Court’s	  decision	   in	  Bob	   Jones	  University	   v.	  United	  States—which	   suggests	   that	  we	   can	   place	   some	  limits	   on	   religious	   belief	   and	   exercise	   that	   compromises	   our	   “fundamental,	   overriding	  interest	  in	  eradicating	  racial	  discrimination.”82	  	  For	  these	  reasons,	  race	  is	  special,	  and	  enjoys	  a	  preeminent	  place	  in	  our	  constitutional	  hierarchy.	  	  	  	  While	   other	   forms	   of	   discrimination—gender,	   sexual	   orientation,	   or	   disability,	   for	  example—all	   encroach	   on	   the	   equality	   and	   inclusion	   principle	   that	   justifies	   state	  supervision	   of	   church	   governance	   decisions,	   I	   am	   not	   prepared	   to	   say	   (yet)	   that	   these	  interests	  should	  trump	  the	  constitutional	  protection	  of	  religion.	  	  	  Efforts	  to	  end	  these	  kinds	  of	   discrimination,	  while	   substantial,	   do	   not	   possess	   quite	   the	   constitutional	   pedigree	   that	  race	  does,	  and	  so,	  for	  now,	  they	  probably	  must	  yield	  to	  the	  Free	  Exercise	  and	  Establishment	  Clauses.	   	  Although	  the	  state	  has	   jurisdiction	   to	  proscribe	  these	  kinds	  of	  religious	  decisions,	  at	   this	   point	   in	   our	   constitutional	   history	   the	   First	   Amendment	   suggests	   it	  must	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  them	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  conclude	  that	  the	  state	  must	  tolerate	  ministerial	  hiring	  decisions	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77	  E.g.,	   Ian	   Bartrum,	  The	  Modalities	  of	  Constitutional	  Argument:	  A	  Primer,	   in	  READINGS	   IN	  PERSUASION:	  BRIEFS	  THAT	  CHANGED	  THE	  WORLD	  (Linda	  Edwards,	  ed.,	  Wolters	  Kluwer	  forthcoming	  2012).	  78	  PHILIP	  BOBBITT,	  CONSTITUTIONAL	  INTERPRETATION	  12-­‐13	  (Blackwell,	  1991).	  79	  Bartrum,	  Religion	  and	  Race,	  supra	  note	  11,	  at	  197-­‐205.	  80	  Id.	  at	  197-­‐201.	  81	  Id.	  at	  201-­‐203.	  82	  Bob	  Jones	  University	  v.	  United	  States,	  461	  U.S.	  574,	  604	  (1983).	  
	   17	  
made	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  gender,	  sexual	  orientation,	  and	  disability,	  but	  that	  it	  should	  step	  in	  to	  prevent	  such	  decisions	  made	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  race.	  	   CONCLUSION	  	  Many	   arguments	   in	   support	   of	   the	   ministerial	   exception	   suggest	   that	   church	  governance	   decisions	   lie	   beyond	   the	   state’s	   jurisdiction.	   	   Thus,	   even	   if	   such	   a	   decision	   is	  illegal,	   the	   state	   simply	   lacks	   the	   authority	   to	  prevent	   it.	   	   This	   conception	  of	   independent	  religious	   sovereignty	  derives	   in	   large	  part	   from	   the	  work	  of	   John	  Locke,	  who	  argued	   that	  church	   and	   state	   operate	   within	   separate,	   and	   at	   least	   partly	   incommensurable,	   spheres.	  	  Taken	   to	   its	   extreme,	   however,	   this	   view	   suggests	   that	   there	   is	   an	   absolute	   ban	   on	   state	  intervention	  in	  church	  governance	  decisions.	  	  Even	  if	  a	  church	  made	  its	  hiring	  decisions	  by	  reading	   the	   entrails	   of	   a	   sacrificial	   virgin,	   for	   example,	   the	   state	   would	   be	   powerless	   to	  interfere.	   	  In	  truth,	  almost	  no	  one	  holds	  such	  a	  view,	  and	  so	  a	  fundamental	  question	  arises	  about	   the	  appropriate	   limits	  on	   religious	   sovereignty	   in	  a	   liberal	  democracy.	   	  Drawing	  on	  the	  methodology	   Thomas	   Kuhn	   described	   for	  making	   choices	   between	   incommensurable	  theoretical	  paradigms,	   I	   argue	  here	   that	  our	  underlying	   constitutional	   values	   suggest	   that	  we	   should	   treat	   church	   governance	   decisions	   that	   threaten	   our	   basic	   commitment	   to	  political	  equality	  and	  inclusion	  as	  capable	  of	  state	  supervision.	  	  In	  making	  this	  choice,	  I	  am	  in	  accord	  with	  Locke,	  who	  suggested	  that	  excommunication	  or	  religious	  discrimination	  lies	  beyond	   state	   competence,	   but	   that	   other	   kinds	   of	   discrimination	   are	   matters	   of	   state	  
tolerance.	   	   Finally,	   I	   conclude	   that	   principles	   of	   religious	   freedom	   require	   the	   state	   to	  tolerate	  church	  governance	  decisions	  made	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  gender,	  sexual	  orientation,	  and	  disability.	  	  	  Racial	  equality,	  however,	  occupies	  a	  special	  place	  in	  our	  constitutional	  hierarchy,	  and	   I	   make	   historical,	   ethical,	   and	   doctrinal	   arguments	   that	   the	   state	   should	   step	   in	   to	  prevent	  racial	  discrimination	  in	  church	  hiring	  decisions.	  	  	  	   	  
